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The harsh truth? British forces won't fight

Our rules of engagement let us down, argues Graham Cushway, a former private security contractor

Published: 3 September 2009

On 29 August, the death of a Royal Marine took the British death toll in Afghanistan to 208. Yet, despite the sacrifice of so many servicemen and women, the top US general there believes ISAF’s mission is failing.

The objectives in Afghanistan are clear. It is a proxy war against religious fundamentalists, concentrating on Taleban personnel who could otherwise head straight from Pakistani madrassas to the streets of the US to perpetrate another 9/11 or 7/7 suicide attack. That they might walk onto the streets of the United Kingdom is more likely, but why, when the conflict is so important to Britain, do British forces perform so poorly?

The British media perpetuates the myth that British forces are the best in the world, particularly compared with the US. However, British forces suffered setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan that disproved this idea. The British Army’s performance in Iraq was poor. As in Afghanistan, British troops were too few in number and short of kit. That British soldiers have insufficient kit is well known, but operational problems run deeper.

In 2007, the Iranians were able to capture British sailors without any kind of fight, when the Australians drove off a similar assault using nothing more than harsh language. There is a much harder truth behind this, which I learned in Basra when I was there as a private security contractor (PSC): British forces won’t fight.

British soldiers were disliked by locals because they wouldn’t fire if civilians were present - so militias used civilians as human shields. PSC personnel were better respected. Why? As one contractor put it, our company’s procedure when encountering the enemy was; ‘Spray brass 360 - looking tasty throughout!’
While he was not being entirely serious, PSCs use American rules of engagement, which contrast with British regulations.

British forces often cannot engage enemy forces because of political meddling intended to transform the Armed forces into politically correct, health and safety-obsessed facsimile of a government department. Units are forced to prioritise ‘Law of Armed Conflict’ training, otherwise known as ‘reasons never to shoot’.

Military commanders contend that this is pretending that Iraq or Afghanistan is Surrey. Tony Blair thought the kidnapped sailors’ were ‘…entirely sensible…’ worrying that if they had started shooting ‘there might have been loss of life…’. Probably not. Law of Armed Conflict training occurs more frequently than range practice. The same deficiencies have been exported to Afghanistan. Taleban patrols are ignored or receive warning shots if not actually engaging British troops. Blair would ‘tut’ at the contractor, but which attitude is more likely to produce victory?
 
Using British rules of engagement mean that ambushing Taleban troops is illegal. Prisoners taken by British forces cannot be given to local police or US forces because of the European Charter on Human Rights. Taleban prisoners are freed after a few days. Legal red tape means they are not even questioned effectively. Political interference also has a corrosive effect.

The frequent British withdrawals from Basra allowed the city to fall into chaos and provoked fury among allies. Military bases were gifted to insurgents. Attempts to ‘do deals’ with the opposition failed because they (predictably) declined to observe their side of the bargain.

Another perennial problem is budget. The war in Afghanistan is fought on a shoestring. Helmand is larger than Wales, but British troops are trying to hold it with 9,000 men. New vehicles were introduced specifically for Afghanistan but penny-pinching ensured poor vehicles were selected. The Panther, the Vector and the Viking are all being withdrawn although almost new. A lack of helicopters is a familiar problem.

Poor equipment can be replaced with articles requested by front line-commanders via the Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR) budget. New Mastiff and Cougar vehicles are undoubtedly a life-saving measure. £1.06 billion was spent on UORs in 2008 – 2009.

However, because of last year’s overspend, this year’s UOR budget has now been slashed by a third. The MoD has also been ordered to repay £365 million to the Treasury. To fund the repayment training has been by three quarters cut at many units, with disastrous consequences.

All of this raises a serious question. Is there really any political will to win the war in Afghanistan? Comparisons of government spending are instructive. During 2008/9, the British Government blew £550billion, or 14 times the annual defence budget, bailing out banks. The money clearly exists to prosecute the war in Afghanistan.

However, if the figure spent on UORs is compared with the amount donated to bankers, it is clear which is the higher priority. It is the bankers - by 312.5 to one.

No wonder our troops are failing.

Comment on this blog

1. At 16.58 on 3 September 2009, Matthew wrote:

As a Canadian soldier this is a very interesting read, it seems our two armed forces are doing a 360. The DND/ Canadian Forces used to be the most neglected dept in the government receiving near enough to just pay our soldiers, let a lone operate as a military and procure new equipment. Now we are in a massive rush to buy the best of every thing and we are no longer the 'peacekeepers' we are fighting in the hardest area of Afghanistan with ROE's just the Americans. The Canadian public has embraced us like never before and show support for us like only seen last in WW2. Our Highway of Heroes was started just by grief and pride of a nation and no government or media. It is such a shame to see the state of our sister military which was once the armed forces we based our entire structure on. Hope things get better for you lads azap, us in the Canadian Forces know what it was like to be going through what you are going through now.

2. At 18.15 on 3 September 2009, Ed wrote:

That's the European Convention on Human Rights, by the way.

I thought the issue in Iraq was so that locals would have to take responsibility eventually. Withdrawal was only ever going to be possible when they did, which they now more or less have (especially after Charge of the Knights).

And I thought the main problem the British forces WERE facing in Afghanistan was that they were 'mowing the lawn' fighting the Taleban in an area, then leaving, so they would return and punish any locals who helped the British. The new strategy of more 'take and hold' at least offers a chance of improvement. The problem with the British deployment was simply the lack of manpower, severely limiting their effectiveness. The US troops will make a big difference.

The British ROE are using proportionate force to defend self or others from an immediate threat. The US ROE are not that different.

3. At 18.12 on 5 September 2009, Roy Turnbull wrote:

Cushway does not know what he's talking about. Having served in Helmand, which evidently he hasn't ROE are not the issue. Yes British soldiers will do their utmost to minimise collateral damage but they will and do engage the TB at every opportunity. The problem is with cross government engagement and lack of investment - that is the lesson not learnt from Iraq.

4. At 10.20 on 7 September 2009, Graham Cushway wrote:

To answer Mr Turnbull, I know Iraq back to front. I was in the country for a year and a half. I was in Basrah during Op Sinbad and later moved up to Nasiriyah. Then I did a few months with the US Marine Corps in Fallujah, right during the time that the Marines were clearing out al-Anbar and was there for A-Q's defeat. I spent the last year in Baghdad, and was there right through the Surge.

I have been blown out of bed by suicide bombers, seen monumental IEDs detonating, had a rocket land outside my front door, seen mortar rounds land, listened to firefights and watched truck bombs detonating.

I have never been to Afghanistan, but I have participated in a lot of training exercises and a lot of my viewpoints are taken from the perspective of what I know will work from Iraq and what will not. More pertinently I know a hell of a lot of people who have either just been there or are on their way there at the moment. As such I have a lot of good intelligence on this and these are mostly frontline viewpoints.


5. At 21.44 on 7 September 2009, Steve wrote:

1) "In 2007, the Iranians were able to capture British sailors without any kind of fight, when the Australians drove off a similar assault using nothing more than harsh language"

This is incorrect.
The two situations were completely different. The Aussies faced less Iranian firepower, which arrived in a trickle over a considerable period, whilst staying aboard a a large merchant ship which they had boarded-providing the cover and tactical advantage the Brits lacked.

Bearing in mind the point of the article: Aussie troops have had very limited involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan because of political fears so the whole Iranian comparison doesn't really work.

2) "Blair would ‘tut’ at the contractor, but which attitude is more likely to produce victory?"

Well the Russians tried the all-guns-blazing method and look where it got them!

6. At 11.58 on 17 September 2009, Varangkol wrote:

It has taken someone like Graham Cushway to rattle the box!  Sure, he might be telling it with tongue in cheek, but I suspect there is a lot of truth in what he says - and it is very debatable.  Are we, the military, being controlled so severely by the politicians?  I believe we are.  Should we be so controlled?  I dont think so.  I believe our military leaders are intelligent enough to know how to play this 'game' now, and should be given a much more freer rein on their activities.  Sure, we dont want a repeat of the U.S. prisoner episode, but with this experience behind us, it can be avoided.

7. At 13.14 on 19 September 2009, Louise wrote:

I know British Forces are the best fighting forces in the world. It does make me wonder if there's too many government yes men at the MOD and in some senior ranks in the military.  It would appear to me that there's too many civillians working for the MOD, and wouldn't know one end of an SA80 from the other.  

8. At 11.34 on 22 September 2009, Isiah wrote:

After the end of WW2, which we won, people were made aware of the unimaginable horrors of total war.  The political classes, in an attempt to appease their collective consciences, cried atrocity.  Since that time 'rules of engagement'  have been applied, hence unneccesary casualities.

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